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A Solution for Drafting Errors in Post-December 31, 1978
Charitable Remainder Trusts: State ex ret
Edmisten v. Sands
Federal estate tax laws permit a deduction for transfers to charitable or-
ganizations.' Prior to 1969 estate planners frequently used split-interest gifts
to obtain this deduction. Property would be transferred in trust for both a
private and charitable use and the estate would deduct the present value of the
charitable interest. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress reacted to a per-
ceived abuse2 of split-interest gifts by prohibiting deduction of the value of the
charitable interest unless the transfer was in a prescribed form. 3 In State ex
rel Edmisten v. Sands4 the testator's will attempted to establish a particular
type of charitable remainder trust known as a charitable remainder unitrust.5
During administration of the estate, it was discovered that the will lacked sev-
eral administrative provisions that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) re-
quires in all instruments governing charitable remainder unitrusts. 6
I. I.R.C. § 2055 (1982).
2. Congressional intent to correct past abuses is set forth in H.R. REp. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 58 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1704.
The rules of present law for determining the amount of a charitable contribution deduc-
tion in the case of gifts of remainder interests in trust do not necessarily have any rela-
tion to the value of the benefit which the charity receives. This is because the trust assets
may be invested in a manner so as to maximize the income interest with the result that
there is little relation between the interest assumptions used in calculating present values
and the amount received by the charity.
See also Ellis First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 550 F.2d 9, 15-16 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Gillespie v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 374, 377-78 (1980).
3. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2) (1982). The restrictions on the form of split-interest gifts produce a
high correlation between the interest assumptions used in calculating the present value of the
charitable interest and the amount received by the charity. Thus, the amount of the charitable
deduction matches the amount the charity ultimately receives, eliminating the abuses discussed
supra note 2. The following four types of split-interest gifts are allowed: (1) charitable remainder
trusts, I.R.C. § 664(d) (1982); (2) pooled income funds, id § 642(c)(5); (3) remainder interests in a
farm or personal residence, id § 170(f)(3)(B); and (4) guaranteed annuity interests, id
§ 2055(e)(2)(B).
I.R.C. § 664(d) (1982) defines two types of charitable remainder trusts-charitable remainder
annuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts. A charitable remainder annuity trust is defined
in section 664(d)(1) as a trust that distributes at least 5% of the corpus at least once a year to a
private beneficiary. The term may extend for the life of the private beneficiary or not more than
20 years. The remainder must go to charity. A charitable remainder unitrust as defined in section
664(d)(2) is similar, but the private beneficiary receives a fixed percentage of the fair market value
of the corpus, valued annually.
A pooled income fund is a fund established by a charity to which donors contribute property
for which they have retained income interests in a private beneficiary. The annual distribution to
each private beneficiary is determined by the income of the pooled assets. Guaranteed annuity
interests are deductible if the annual income distributed to the charity is either a sum certain or a
fixed percentage of the trust assets. A discussion of pooled income funds, remainder interests in a
farm or personal residence, and guaranteed annuity interests can be found in Moore, Estate Plan-
ning Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969: The Uses of Charity, 56 VA. L. REv. 565 (1970).
4. 307 N.C. 670, 300 S.E.2d 387 (1983).
5. See supra note 3. For a discussion of the charitable remainder unitrust provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, see infra text accompanying notes 9-16.
6. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
Consequently, the IRS denied the deduction claimed for the charitable re-
mainder and proposed an increase in estate tax liability. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, upheld an order construing the will and trust to
include the requisite administrative provisions.7
This note examines Sands and other cases granting similar relief for de-
fective instruments governing charitable remainder trusts, the effect on the
IRS of construction orders made during the post-1969 Tax Reform Act transi-
tion period, and the public policy arguments favoring such construction or-
ders. The note also analyzes the North Carolina Supreme Court's use of
North Carolina General Statutes section 36A-53(a)8 to uphold the construc-
tion order entered by the trial court in Sands.
To qualify as a charitable remainder unitrust, the trust must distribute at
least once a year to a private beneficiary a fixed percentage (at least five per-
cent) of the fair market value of the trust assets, valued annually.9 The trust
term may extend for the life of the private beneficiary or for not more than
twenty years. 10 Upon termination of these distributions, the trust must pro-
vide for transfer of the remainder interest to a charitable organization recog-
nized by the IRS. I I In addition to the rules limiting the dispositive terms of
the trust, the regulations promulgated under section 664 by the Treasury De-
partment require that the governing instrument contain certain administrative
provisions. 12 The Code also includes prohibitions against self-dealing, 13 ex-
cess business holdings, 14 investments that jeopardize the charitable purpose of
the trust,' 5 and certain taxable expenditures. 16
The 1969 revisions that contained the split-interest gift restrictions apply
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30-36.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(a) (Supp. 1983).
9. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(A)-(B) (1982).
10. Id § 664(d)(2)(A).
11. Id § 664(d)(2)(C).
12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(b) (1972) (noting the applicability of I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2) to
charitable remainder trusts). I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2) (1982) subjects charitable remainder trusts to
many of the private foundation rules. I.R.C. § 508(e) (1982) sets forth the rules relating to the
required provisions in instruments governing private foundations and charitable remainder trusts
under I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 13-16. Section 508(d)(2)(B)
disallows a charitable deduction for transfers to trusts that do not contain provisions required
under § 508(e).
13. I.R.C. § 4941 (1982). Acts of self-dealing as outlined in § 4941(d)(1) may include: (I) the
sale, exchange, or leasing of property between a private foundation and a disqualified person; (2)
the lending of money or other extension of credit between a private foundation and a disqualified
person; (3) the furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a private foundation and a dis-
qualified person; (4) the payment of compensation by a private foundation to a disqualified per-
son; (5) the transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets
of a private foundation; or (6) the agreement by a private foundation to give money or other
property to a government official. A disqualified person is defined in § 4946 and includes any
manager of the foundation, anyone connected with a manager of the foundation, and anyone
connected with the creator of the foundation.
14. Id § 4943. A private foundation has excess business holdings if it and all disqualified
persons own more than an aggregate 20% interest in a business.
15. Id § 4944. Investments made without ordinary business care and prudence jeopardize
the charitable purpose.
16. Id § 4945. Taxable expenditures include amounts paid by a foundation: (1) to influence
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to decedents dying after December 31, 1969.17 The complexity of these restric-
tions, however, led to a series of transition rules allowing amendments to non-
conforming instruments.' 8 The present transition period covers instruments
executed before December 31, 1978, and authorizes amendments through De-
cember 31, 1981.19
In Sands20 the testator's will directed the executor to transfer the residue
of the testator's estate to a charitable remainder unitrust. The trustee was in-
structed to distribute annually the lesser of the trust income or five percent of
the fair market value of the trust assets,21 valued annually, to the decedent's
sisters for life. The trust was to terminate upon the death of the last surviving
sister, with the remainder to pass free of trust to a local church. Clearly, the
trust met the dispositive requirements of Internal Revenue Code section
664(d)(2), 22 but the will creating the trust failed to 'impose a prohibition
against self-dealing and omitted several other required trust administration
provisions.23 Since the will was executed on August 23, 1979, more than seven
months after the last grace period had expired, any reformation of the will
would not have qualified for recognition under the transition rules.24 The IRS
disallowed the deduction of the charitable remainder because of the omission
and proposed an increase in estate tax liability.
North Carolina's Attorney General, representing the charity and the pub-
lic,25 filed a complaint in superior court seeking an order construing the will to
include the administrative provisions or, alternatively, an order retroactive to
legislation; (2) to influence the outcome of a public election; (3) as a grant to an individual for
travel, study, or other similar purposes; and (4) as a grant to an organization other than a charity.
Rev. Rul. 72-395, 1972-2 C.B. 340 gives examples of language that will satisfy the adminis-
trative provision requirements. See also Wren, Charitable Remainder Trusts: Some Considerations
to Draftmanship, 8 U. RICH. L. Rav. 25 (1973).
17. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(d), 83 Stat. 487, 580.
18. The Treasury Department granted the original transition period in Treas. Reg. § 1.664-
1(0(3) (1972). This regulation gave trusts created after July 31, 1969, but before December 31,
1972, until December 31, 1972, time to be amended. If the change resulted from judicial construc-
tion, Rev. Rul. 74-283, 1974-1 C.B. 283 provided that the construction would be effective as long
as legal proceedings were initiated before December 31, 1972.
In 1974 Congress granted instruments executed after July 31, 1969, but before September 21,
1974, a grace period ending December 31, 1975, to amend nonconforming instruments or to initi-
ate legal proceedings for construction. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-483, § 3(a), 88 Stat.
1456, 1457-58 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3) (1982)). The Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1304(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1715, expanded the transition period to cover instru-
ments executed before December 31, 1977, and extended the cut-off date to December 31, 1977.
The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 514(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2883-84, extended the cut-
off date to December 31, 1978. In 1980 Congress again amended § 2055(e)(3) to extend the cut-off
date for instruments executed before December 31, 1978 to December 31, 1981. Act of Dec. 28,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 301(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3530.
19. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(3) (1982).
20. 307 N.C. 670, 300 S.E.2d 387 (1983).
21. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(1) (1972), the lesser of the trust income or 5% of the fair
market value of the assets, valued annually, is a permissible alternative for distribution.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-52(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983) grants the Attorney General power to
enforce charitable trusts.
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the decedent's death reforming the will to include the administrative provi-
sions. 26 The trial court first noted the public policy of preserving charitable
transfers whenever possible.27 The court then reasoned that the failure to
qualify the trust as a charitable remainder unitrust increased the estate tax
liability and reduced the amount of the charitable bequest. According to the
court, the testator intended to leave the maximum amount to charity and any
reduction constituted a partial failure of the charitable bequest. The trial court
concluded that this failure permitted it to invoke North Carolina General Stat-
utes 36A-53(a), (b)28 and order an administration of the trust in accordance
with IRS requirements to fulfill the charitable intention of the testator.
29
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court3" noted that section 36A-
53(b)3 1 applied only to instruments executed before December 31, 1978. The
court rejected application of section 36A-53(b) as the basis for a construction
or reformation order since the will had been executed on August 23, 1979, but
upheld application of section 36A-53(a).32 According to the court, a trust must
meet the three following conditions to qualify for relief under this subsection:
(1) it must be a charitable trust; (2) it must be impracticable of fulfillment; and
(3) the testator must not have provided any alternate disposition of the prop-
erty.33 The court found that the trust in Sands met the first and last condi-
tions.3 4 The court also found that the second condition was fulfilled, because
the phrase "impracticable of fulfillment," as used in section 36A-53(a) and
defined in section 36A-53(d), includes the failure of a charitable remainder
trust "expressly [to] include a provision prohibiting the trustee from engaging
in any act of self-dealing."35 The court reasoned that the legislature intended
26. Sands, 307 N.C. at 672, 300 S.E.2d at 389.
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-52(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983):
Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of North Caro-
lina that gifts, transfers, grants, bequests, and devises for religious, educational, charita-
ble, or benevolent uses or purposes. . . are and shall be valid, notwithstanding the fact
that any such gift, transfer, grant, bequest, or devise shall be in general terms, and this
section shall be construed liberally to affect the policy herein declared.
28. Id § 36A-53(a)-(b). Section 36A-53(a) gives superior court judges the authority to order
an administration if. (1) the testator manifested a general intention to devote the property to
charity; (2) the trust has become illegal, impossible, or impracticable of fulfillment; and (3) no
alternative disposition of the property was made. Section 36A-53(b) gives the court the authority
to amend wills executed before December 31, 1978, so that charitable gifts will qualify for a fed-
eral estate tax deduction under the split-interest gift provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
29. Sands, 307 N.C. at 672, 300 S.E.2d at 389.
30. Sands was certified for direct transfer to the North Carolina Supreme Court pursuant to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
31. See supra note 28.
32. See supra note 28.
33. Sands, 307 N.C. at 675, 300 S.E.2d at 390.
34. Id at 675, 300 S.E.2d at 391 ("Mr. Sands' intent [to provide scholarships for Methodist
children] could hardly be more manifestly expressed . . . . IT]he will does not provide for an
alternate disposition of the corpus in the event the trust fails as a charitable trust.").
35. Id at 676, 300 S.E.2d at 391. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(d) (Cum. Supp. 1983) defines
"impracticable of fullfilment as:
[T]he failure of any trust for charity, testamentary or inter vivos, (including, .. chari-
table remainder trusts described in section 664 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
... ) to include, if required to do so by section 508(e) or section 4947(a) of the Internal
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section 36A-53(a) to apply whenever a charitable remainder trust failed to in-
corporate "the 'boilerplate' required by IRS regulations. '36 Thus, the applica-
tion of section 36A-53(a) as a basis for relief was justified.
In fashioning an order to fulfill the testator's intent as directed by section
36A-53(a), the court noted that the IRS treats an instrument as speaking from
its effective date.37 A reformation order might be viewed to speak only from
the date of entry,38 and thus would not ensure favorable tax treatment of the
trust. An order of construction, however, treats the instrument as if it had
always contained the provisions, thus ensuring a charitable deduction and ful-
fillment of the trust purpose.39 Consequently, the court affirmed the trial
court's construction order and vacated the order of reformation. In evaluating
the soundness of the court's holding, it is necessary to consider the background
against which the case was decided.
Instruments drafted after the revision of the split-interest gift rules often
proved defective because the complexity of the provisions led many drafters to
omit language critical to favorable tax treatment of the charitable interest.
State courts became an important vehicle for saving the charitable deduction,
and orders construing or reforming charitable remainder trust instruments
similar to that granted in Sands were common under the transition rules.40
For example, in Estate of Bird,41 a New York Surrogate's Court construed a
trust that did not contain administrative provisions required by the regula-
tions. A New York statute had obviated the need for amendment of trust
instruments to preserve favorable tax status by providing for administration of
private charitable trusts and split-interest trusts in accordance with federal re-
quirements. 42 The New York court granted construction of the trust in Bird
based on this statute. Other cases also have demonstrated the willingness of
state courts to grant the relief sought, as long as the executor or trustee was
seeking construction of administrative rather than dispositive provisions.43
These results were justified on public policy grounds. A construction or-
Revenue Code of 1954. the provisions relating to governing instruments set forth in
section 508(e) ....
Since the Sands trust was charitable and required by § 508(e) and § 4947(a) to include the
provisions relating to governing instruments in § 508(e), see supra text accompanying notes 12-16,
any failure to include the various administrative provisions made the trust "impracticable of
fulfillment."
36. Sands, 307 N.C. at 676, 300 S.E.2d at 391.
37. Id at 677, 300 S.E.2d at 392.
38. Id
39. Id
40. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burdon-Miller, 456 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1983); In re Estate of
Barker, 82 Misc. 2d 974, 370 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Surr. Ct. 1975); In re Will of Hammer, 81 Misc. 2d 25,
362 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Surr. Ct. 1974); Estate of Bird, 69 Misc. 2d 1015, 332 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Surf. Ct.
1972).
41. 69 Misc. 2d 1015, 332 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Surr. Ct. 1972).
42. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.8 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
43. See supra note 40. Cf. Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Maryland Nat'l Bank,
270 Md. 564, 312 A.2d 546 (1973) (reading the will as a whole testator would prefer enforcement
of dispositive provisions to loss of the charitable deduction; court has no power to modify an
instrument when the action would conflict with testator's intent).
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der during the transition period preserved a charitable deduction for the es-
tate. This decrease in the estate tax liability increased the amount ultimately
available for charitable purposes, which furthered the policy favoring charita-
ble contributions. 44 These orders also promoted the policy favoring enforce-
ment of the Internal Revenue Code. Any relief, to be effective, had to order
compliance with the 1969 Tax Reform Act and regulations. Thus, these orders
helped prevent a recurrence of the earlier abuses of split-interest gifts. Con-
struction orders also made charitable remainder trusts more available to peo-
ple who could not afford an estate planning specialist. The complex 1969
revisions had removed drafting of charitable remainder trusts from the compe-
tency of general practitioners. 45 People unable to retain the services of an
estate planning specialist might have avoided charitable remainder trusts.
Construction orders, however, led more general practitioners to recommend
charitable remainder trusts, since they knew that a minor drafting defect could
be cured. In addition to the public policy favoring construction orders, several
state legislatures explicitly granted relief guaranteeing charitable remainder
trust status.46 Orders construing wills to include the requisite provisions
merely followed public policy and these statutes.
In nontransition-period cases it was uncertain whether state courts would
display the same willingness to grant relief solely on public policy grounds.
Some statutes obviating the need for trust amendments did not apply to non-
transition cases. 47 Additionally, in Commisioner v. Estate of Bosch 48 the
United States Supreme Court held that when federal estate tax liability de-
pends on a state-created property right, the IRS is not bound by a state court
determination of that right unless the state's highest court had ruled on the
question. The IRS implicitly indicated that Bosch would apply to nonqualify-
ing charitable remainder trusts when it suspended the application of Bosch in
transition-period cases. 49 Thus, in deciding whether to grant a nontransition-
period construction order, state courts had to balance public policy in favor of
the order against the absence of a statute and the possibility that the order
might be moot because the IRS would not be bound.
The first test of a court's willingness to grant relief in a nontransition-
period case arose in In re Will ofStalp.5° In Staip the testatrix left property in
44. See, e.g., supra note 27. See also Keith v. Scales, 124 N.C. 497, 515, 32 S.E. 809, 812
(1899) ("Courts incline strongly in favor of charitable gifts, and take special care to enforce
them.").
45. This problem with the 1969 revisions was identified in Pedrick, And then to Charity:
Charitable Remainder Trusts andthe FederalEstate Tax, 17 INST. ON EST. PLAN. §§ 303-07 (1983).
46. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2271.1-2271.2 (West Supp. 1984); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 14-301 to -308 (1974 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.8 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (applies only to wills executed
before December 31, 1978).
48. 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (IRS not bound by state court's determination of the effect of an
instrument releasing a general power of appointment).
49. Rev. Rul. 74-283, 1974-1 C.B. 157. See also Wissbrun, Bosch andits Aftermath: The Effect
o/State Court Decisions on Federal Tax Questions, 114 TR. & EST. 8 (1975).
50. 79 Misc. 2d 412, 359 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Surr. Ct. 1974).
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trust to pay one hundred dollars a month to her aunt for life and the remain-
der to a hospital. The aunt's income interest did not comply with the required
annual distribution of at least five percent of the trust corpus, as required in
the charitable remainder trust rules.5 1 The executor petitioned for a construc-
tion of the trust instrument to save the charitable deduction even though the
action fell between amendments to the transition rules. The court granted re-
lief by segregating the private annuity interest from the charitable interest,
stating that public policy compelled the result notwithstanding its nonbinding
effect on the IRS. The result in nontransition-period cases remained uncertain
after Stalp, however, because the court seemed influenced by a pending
amendment to the transition rules.5 2
Last Will and Testament of Kander,5 3 however, resolved any remaining
doubt, at least in New York, in favor of nontransition-period construction or-
ders. In Kander the testator directed that ninety percent of the income and
remainder from a trust established by his will be paid to charity. The remain-
ing ten percent was devised to a private beneficiary and an unrecognized char-
ity. Despite the absence of an applicable transition rule, the court ordered
segregation of the two interests into two trusts so that the ninety percent inter-
est would qualify for a charitable deduction. The court reasoned that any
other result "would be inconsistent with reason and justice." 54
The trial court's decision in Sands followed the view of the New York
courts in Stap and Kander that public policy 55 compels a construction order.
The trial court also used the statutory authority in section 36A-53(a) to grant
the construction order. But Sands presented an even stronger case for con-
struction. Not only did public policy and section 36A-53(a) support construc-
tion, but the supreme court did not have to consider the decision's possible
inconclusive effect on the IRS.5 6 Viewed in this light, the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Sands was justified.
Arguably, however, section 36A-53(a) did not support the construction
order in Sands. The words "illegal," "impossible," and "impracticable of ful-
fillment" used in section 36A-53(a) connote a total failure of a charitable gift
rather than mere disqualification for a federal estate tax deduction. Disquali-
fication of the trust in Sands would have reduced the amount available to the
charity but would not have made the gift any less enforceable. A greater fail-
ure than that in Sands should be required to invoke the power granted in
section 36A-53(a). Section 36A-53(b) strengthens this view because it specifi-
cally mentions the failure of a trust to qualify for a federal estate tax deduction
51. See supra text accompanying note 9.
52. Stalp, 79 Misc. 2d at 421, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 756. See also In re Will of Rayvid, 88 Misc. 2d
372, 388 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Surr. Ct. 1976) (later case granting similar relief decided between
amendments).
53. 115 Misc. 2d 386, 454 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Surr. Ct. 1982).
54. Id at 388, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
56. Because the decision came from the state's highest court, the IRS had to accept the court's
determination and allow the charitable deduction. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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under the charitable remainder trust rules. 57 If the legislature had wanted dis-
qualification to invoke the authority in section 36A-53(a) it would have specif-
ically mentioned it in that section or in the definition of impracticable of
fulfillment.5 8
Moreover, the court was not without a statutory alternative. The Charita-
ble Remainder Trusts Administration Act5 9 states that:
Notwithstanding any provisions in the laws of this State or in the
governing instruments to the contrary, any charitable remainder an-
nuity trust and any charitable remainder unitrust that cannot qualify
for a deduction for federal tax purposes under section 2055 . . . of
the Code in the absence of this Article shall be administered in ac-
cordance with this Article. 60
The Act contains all of the administrative provisions necessary to qualify the
trust as a charitable remainder trust.61 This statute is more clearly applicable
in Sands than is section 36A-53(a) because it specifically mentions failure to
qualify for a deduction as a condition to its applicability. Moreover, the IRS
has recognized this type of statute as effective to preserve a charitable deduc-
tion.62 The trial court did not use the Act because it was not enacted until
after the court had decided the case.63 The Act was passed during the pen-
dency of the appeal, however, and made retroactive to the creation date of the
trust.64 Given the Act's clearer applicability and its acceptance by the IRS, the
supreme court in Sands should have considered employing its provisions in-
stead of affirming the use of section 36A-53(a).
The use of section 36A-53(a) instead of the Charitable Remainder Trusts
Administration Act creates problems because the court had to specify the re-
lief granted to save the charitable deduction.65 The court's distinction be-
tween reformation and construction is not justified. Reformation has been
defined as "a remedy to parties and the privies of parties to written instru-
ments, to rectify them where they fail, through mistake or fraud, to conform
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-53(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides:
In the case of a will executed before December 31, 1978 .. ifa federal tax deduction is
not allowed at the time of the decedent's death. . any judge may. . . order an amend-
ment to the trust so that the remainder interest is in a trust which is a charitable remain-
der [trust].
58. See supra note 35.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-59.1 to -59.7 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
60. Id § 36A-59.2.
61. Id §§ 36A-59.4 to -59.6.
62. As noted in supra note 12, charitable remainder trusts are subject to the governing instru-
ment requirements of I.R.C. § 508(e) (1982). Treas. Reg. § 1.508-3(d)(1) (1972) states that gov-
erning instruments will be deemed to meet the § 508(e) requirements if valid provisions of state
law either require the foundation to operate in conformity with the mandatory language (as in the
Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act) or treat the language as being contained in the
governing instrument. These rules apply without regard to any transition rules. See also Rev.
Rul. 75-38, 1975-1 C.B. 161.
63. The Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act was enacted on Ju1ne 18, 1982.
The trial court entered its order on February 16, 1982.
64. Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act, ch. 1252, § 2, 1982 N.C. Seass. Laws
149 states that "this act relates back to the date of creation of the trust."
65. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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with the real agreement." 66 Construction, on the other hand, is "an effort to
find the mind of the testator as expressed in the will. ' '67 In Sands the court
added trust administration language that mistakenly had been omitted from
the will, when it should have discerned the intended meaning of language con-
tained in the will. This process falls within the definition of reformation, yet
the court classified it as construction to save the charitable deduction.68 In-
stead of using the two doctrines interchangeably, the court could have granted
general relief under the Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act.
This basis for relief would have preserved the charitable deduction69 and the
integrity of the two doctrines.
Whether based on the Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration Act
or section 36A-53(a), the Sands decision probably will not lead to judicial con-
struction of defectiveprivate trusts so that they too will qualify for favorable
tax treatment. Although the policy that supports making tax favored trusts
more available to the average taxpayer 70 also applies to private express trusts,
no public policy favors these conveyances and no specific statutory authority
to grant relief exists. Furthermore, the use of charitable remainder trusts is
limited. Favorable construction of other trusts would result in increased judi-
cial supervision of private express trusts. This might unduly burden the courts
and probably would override any factors in favor of extending Sands to other
trusts.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the will and trust in
Sands certainly benefited the private income beneficiaries and the charitable
remainderman. More importantly, the result demonstrated the court's willing-
ness to forgive technical drafting errors that could jeopardize a charitable de-
duction. Yet given the somewhat strained application of section 36A-53(a), in
future cases the courts of North Carolina should consider granting relief pur-
suant to the recently enacted Charitable Remainder Trusts Administration
Act. Either alternative, however, should appeal to attorneys in North Caro-
lina. Armed with a healthy respect for the complex charitable remainder trust
rules and two avenues for correcting mistakes, practitioners should not hesi-
tate to recommend these trusts to effect their clients' charitable aims.
DANIEL Louis JOHNSON, JR.
66. Henderson v. Henderson, 158 Tenn. 452, 453, 14 S.W.2d 714, 715 (1929).
67. Baker v. Edge, 174 N.C. 100, 102, 93 S.E. 462, 463 (1917).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
69. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
70. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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